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[Excerpt] The primary purpose of this paper is to empirically test among both the intra- and the inter-
generational version of these three hypotheses for higher (i.e. post-secondary) levels of education for one 
less developed country, Kenya. A secondary purpose is to investigate other economic aspects of 
spending on higher education, most notably the question of horizontal equity in school finance. Before 
proceeding, a methodological point is in order. There is no consensus in the public economics literature 
on what is a suitable criterion for assessing the equitability of a fiscal programme. At least three criteria 
may be distinguished (the terminology is my own): (1) The Equal Opportunity Criterion. By this criterion, a 
fiscal programme is equitable if different groups in the population have access to the programme in 
proportion to their numbers in the population, irrespective of the costs paid by the different groups in 
relation to benefits received. (2) The Cost-Benefit Criterion. By this criterion, a fiscal programme is 
equitable if the costs paid by different groups in the population are proportional to the benefits they each 
receive, irrespective of access to the programme. (3) The Ability to Pay Criterion. By this criterion, due to 
diminishing marginal utility of income, a programme is equitable if the cost-benefit ratio of the 
programme rises as a function of income. Evidently, when confronted with a given set of facts, these 
criteria may yield very different qualitative judgements about the equitability of a fiscal programme. We 
note that the cost-benefit and the equal opportunity criteria apply horizontally (i.e. between individuals in 
the same income class) as well as vertically (i.e. for comparisons across income classes). Note also that 
the equal opportunity criterion refers primarily to infer-generational distributional effects, whereas the 
other two are primarily intra-generational. 
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 HIGHER EDUCATION AND INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION IN A LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY 
GARY S. FIELDS1 
Yale University 
 
 Three competing hypotheses have been advanced concerning the effect of government education spending and finance on 
income distribution. One hypothesis is that educational spending leads to income redistribution in favour of the poor. The alternative 
hypothesis is that educational spending results in an even wider gap between rich and poor. Finally, there is the null hypothesis, which 
holds that the aggregate distribution of income is determined by many things other than education which, by this hypothesis, has little 
or no effect. These hypotheses apply to the effects of education spending and finance on the size distribution of income within a 
generation and to the effects upon movement between (relative) income classes between generations. 
 The primary purpose of this paper is to empirically test among both the intra- and the inter-generational version of these three 
hypotheses for higher (i.e. post-secondary)2 levels of education for one less developed country, Kenya.3 A secondary purpose is to 
investigate other economic aspects of spending on higher education, most notably the question of horizontal equity in school finance. 
Before proceeding, a methodological point is in order. There is no consensus in the public economics literature on what is a suitable 
criterion for assessing the equitability of a fiscal programme.4 At least three criteria may be distinguished (the terminology is my own): (1) 
The Equal Opportunity Criterion. By this criterion, a fiscal programme is equitable if different groups in the population have access to the 
programme in proportion to their numbers in the population, irrespective of the costs paid by the different groups in relation to benefits 
received. (2) The Cost-Benefit Criterion. By this criterion, a fiscal programme is equitable if the costs paid by different groups in the 
population are proportional to the benefits they each receive, irrespective of access to the programme. (3) The Ability to Pay Criterion. By 
                                            
1 This paper was began when the author was Visiting Research Associate, Institute for Development Studies, University of 
Nairobi; continued at the Chr. Michelson Institute, Bergen, Norway; and completed at the Economic Growth Center, Yale 
University. Thanks are extended to the above institutions and to the Rockefeller Foundation, which provided the financial 
support for the author’s stay in Kenya. John Akin, William Neenan, Svein-Erik Rested, and David Stern provided helpful 
comments during the preparation of this paper. Finally, I wish to thank Julia Collins for her invaluable research assistance. 
2 Regrettably, no data exist to permit similar tests for lower levels of education. 
3 The Kenya data are particularly rich, especially for a less developed country. None the less, many assumptions and 
approximations have had to be made. The reader should bear the fragmentary nature of the underlying data in mind and 
interpret what follows with care. 
4 The methodology utilized here is similar in a number of respects (though different in many others) to that used in a study 
of California’s higher education system by Hansen and Weisbrod [4], An illuminating controversy on their work involving, 
among others, Joseph Pechman [8], has questioned the conceptual framework for evaluating the income distribution 
effects of a fiscal programme. The present paper borrows from both without taking either side, and in some ways is most 
similar to the treatment suggested by Robert Hartman [5]. 
 this criterion, due to diminishing marginal utility of income, a programme is equitable if the cost-benefit ratio of the programme rises as 
a function of income. Evidently, when confronted with a given set of facts, these criteria may yield very different qualitative judgements 
about the equitability of a fiscal programme.5 We note that the cost- benefit and the equal opportunity criteria apply horizontally (i.e. 
between individuals in the same income class) as well as vertically (i.e. for comparisons across income classes). Note also that the equal 
opportunity criterion refers primarily to infer-generational distributional effects, whereas the other two are primarily intra-generational. 
1. Students’ socio-economic background 
 Kenya’s educational system consists of seven primary grades (called standards), four years of secondary and two years of higher 
secondary schooling (called forms), and a post-secondary system comprised of teacher training colleges and a university.6 The Kenya 
government has expressed a strong commitment to equalizing the distribution of income [12, pp. 2-3] and open recruitment to the 
educational system is seen as one of the main means of bringing this about. However, like many other less developed countries, Kenya 
has a very steep ‘educational pyramid’. The reason this is important is that one cannot simply decide to continue his education and do 
so. Rather, school admissions are highly competitive, the main criterion being performance on written examinations at the end of a 
course of study.7 There is a great demand for education at all levels relative to the supply. This is because the educational system is almost 
entirely subsidized find the private benefits of education are very large. For instance, university education is free (except to non-citizens) 
and the starting salary of a university graduate in the civil service is four times that of a secondary graduate. Consequently, the private 
rates of return to investment in higher levels of education in Kenya are very high—of the order of 30 percent per year (see Table II below). 
 These facts—a steep educational pyramid, express public policy in favour of greater income equality, and large private benefits 
to those few who receive higher education—raise the question of the socio-economic background of the children who receive the 
rewards. To answer this question, I was able to make use of unpublished data on the characteristics of the parents of university students 
                                            
5  
By the cost-benefit criterion, the programme is equitable, because the percentage of costs equals the percentage of 
benefits for both high and low income people. By the equal opportunity criterion, the programme is inequitable and favours 
low-income people, who are 75 percent of the population, yet 100 percent of the beneficiaries. By the ability-to-pay 
criterion, the programme is inequitable and favours high-income people, who despite their higher incomes have the «nun 
cost-benefit ratio as low-income people. Although this lack of a single equity criterion does not affect the method of 
analysis, the choice of criterion does affect the interpretation of the results. 
6 Out of a total population of 10 million, in 1070 there were 1,300,000 children in primary school, 125,000 in secondary, 
and 10,000 in postsecondary, of whom 7,000 were in teacher training colleges and the remainder at the University of 
Nairobi. All these pupils, except for 50,000 secondary students, attended government-operated schools. 
7 Both the examinations and the curriculum reflect the legacy of colonialism and are not very different from the British 
educational system of today. 
 which were already available,8 and I supplemented these by personally gathering data from the teacher training colleges.9 The basic 
findings are reported in Table I. 
 
 In general, as compared with all adult males in Kenya, the students’ parents are more likely to be in a high-level occupation, to 
                                            
8 I wish to thank 8. E. Rastad for making the University data available to me. These data were compiled from personal 
interviews with 188 students (out of a total graduating class of 220) at the University of Nairobi in 1970. Some of Rastad’s 
results are reported in [9]. 
9 During May and June of 19711 visited six of the twenty-four primary teacher training colleges (these six were selected to 
include one school in each of the four major tribal areas plus two smaller but important tribes) and the two secondary 
teacher training colleges for the purposes of administering a ‘Barents’ Occupation Questionnaire’. In all, I received 1,732 
usable responses from students in primary teacher training colleges and 449 from students in the secondary TTCs. 
 be better educated, to own land, and (if landowners) to have larger landholdings. If these are taken as measures of socio-economic status, 
we thus observe that Kenyan students come from families with higher-than-average socioeconomic status. This is true for each type of 
higher education. Moreover, the parents of University of Nairobi students come from an even higher socio-economic background than 
students at the teacher training colleges. Thus, we find that the children of the relatively well-to-do tend to benefit more from Kenya’s 
higher education system than the children of poorer families and that this tendency is most pronounced at the university level. 
 If all families contributed equally to the financing of the school system, these findings would in and of themselves indicate that 
the educational system is financed inequitably by all of the criteria discussed above. However, one’s taxes rise with one’s income so it is 
not clear which income groups gain and which lose from educational spending. Our task in the remaining sections is to find out. 
2. Magnitude of the costs and benefits 
 The magnitudes of the costs and benefits of different types of higher education and private rates of return to investment in each 
type tire shown in Table II.  
 
 Looking first at the costs, we see that the direct costs of schooling are entirely subsidized.10 Students receive tuition, books, room and 
board, a clothing allowance, and a very small cash living allowance. The government justifies these fee policies on the grounds that these 
people are the future leaders of the country and no able person should be discouraged on account of inability to meet the fees. 
For the benefits of higher education, we take the public service salary schedule as our standard. The benefit streams shown in rows 6-8 
are calculated on the assumptions that a person completes Form 4 at age 19 (the actual average completion age) and retires at age 55 
(the compulsory civil service retirement age) and his earnings progress within his initial civil service rank but he is not promoted.11,12 
3. Incidence of the indirect costs 
 As we have seen, Kenya’s higher education system is funded almost entirely by the government. Consequently, in order to 
determine the incidence of school costs, we must examine the sources of the government’s revenues. Duties and excises are the main 
sources of revenue, with income taxes nearly as great. Graduated Personal Tax (GPT) is the only other single item of any substantial 
magnitude. The specific revenue sources are discussed briefly below. 
A. Revenue sources 
Income taxes 
 Kenya has both a personal and a corporate income tax which combined account for 35 per cent of the government’s revenues. 
The income tax is administered by the East African Community.13 The rate structure of the personal income tax is highly progressive, with 
marginal rates from 12-5 to 77-5 per cent of chargeable income. The personal income tax provides a single allowance of shs. 4,320, 
married allowance of shs. 9,600, and children’s allowance of shs. 2,400 per child up to a maximum of four.14 The allowances for a married 
man with four children Eire almost 20 times the per capita income. Thus, most families pay no income tax. In 1967, the last year for which 
data were available, fewer than 35,000 individuals (compared with a population of 10 million) were subject to income tax. 
                                            
10 There are two classes of exceptions to this generalization: foreign students at the University of Nairobi who are not 
subsidized by the Kenyan government (but who are usually fully subsidized by their own governments), and Kenya 
residents who are not citizens who receive only partial, not total, subsidies. 
11 Two objections to the use of the civil service salary scales might be voiced. First, the private sector generally pays 
higher wages than the public sector. And second, since only the best students (as measured by exams) are able to go on 
to the next level, only a portion of the additional earnings is attributable to the education itself. To the first objection, we 
note that nearly all Kenyans who have completed higher education are employed by the government, so that the 
government salary scale is relevant. On the second point, two facts are important: educational attainment determines the 
job for which an individual is hired, and the salary is a function of the job. These facts mean that the entire civil service 
salary differential is the private benefit an individual could expect to receive if he is able to continue his education.  
12 No allowance is made for wastage (flunking out or dropping out) since both are rare. 
13 The East African Community includes the countries of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Besides administering income 
tax collections, the Community operates such services as posts and telecommunications, railways and harbours, and 
power in the three counties. The Community also comprises a duty-free common market.  
14 In 1971 one Kenyan shilling equaled $.14 U.S. 
 The marginal company income tax rate is 40 per cent. The system of deductions is less generous than in the U.S. and U.K. and other 
developing countries.15 
Graduated Personal Tax (GPT) 
 The GPT, accounting for 5 per cent of revenue, is a graduated lump sum tax, mildly regressive over low income ranges, mildly 
progressive over high income ranges, and strongly regressive within an income class. The bulk of the tax is collected from low income 
people. There are no personal allowances or deductions; gross income is the tax base. 
Import duties and excise taxes 
 These sources together yield 40 per cent of government revenues. The rate structure of import duties is designed to protect 
local industries, encourage manufacturing by having low or zero rates on inputs, and place heavy taxes on luxuries. Imports from the 
other countries of the East African Community are exempted from duty. The most important revenue-producing items are fuels, textiles, 
transport equipment, and food, drink, and tobacco. The bulk of excise revenues were collected from beer, sugar, and cigarettes. 
B. Incidence of personal taxes 
 Columns 2-5 of Table III present estimates of the incidence of taxation in Kenya. These data are derived largely from a recent 
study of Kenya’s tax system by Westlake [10] [11], who analysed household budget survey data for 1,146 African16 households in Kenya’s 
three main urban areas. The most noteworthy feature of column 2 is the regressivity of indirect taxes over the lower brackets which 
include the vast percentage of the African population. In column 3, we see the regressivity of the over-all tax incidence in the lower 
brackets. Column 5 indicates that two-thirds of the personal tax burden falls on persons in the lowest income bracket. 
C. Incidence of Indirect education costs 
 From the information in Table m, we are able to estimate the incidence of the indirect costs of each type of higher education by 
making two simplifying assumptions: (1) Each person’s contribution to the financing of the educational system is equal to his total tax bill 
multiplied by the fraction of the government budget which is spent on education. (2) His contribution to each type of higher education is 
proportional to the importance of that type of education in the over-all educational budget. The percentage of taxes paid to finance a 
particular type of higher education is then multiplied by the average tax bill within an income bracket to give an estimate of the tax 
contribution for each type of higher education by income bracket.17 These are found to range from a high of shs. 63 for the highest 
                                            
15 See [1] 
16 ‘African’ is a racial term denoting blacks, as opposed to African (browns) and Europeans (whites) 
17 To give an example of how these figures were constructed consider the contribution of a person in the highest income 
bracket to the financing of the University of Nairobi In 1969/70 the Kenya government spent 14 percent of its budget on 
education. 15 percent of the educational budget was spent on university education (6 per cent was spent on primary 
teacher training colleges and 3 percent on secondary teacher training colleges). Thus, an estimated 2-1 percent of a 
person’s tax contribution went to financing the University. Persons in the highest income bracket paid an average of 12-5 
percent of their incomes in taxes (see column 3 of Table III). Evaluated at the midpoint of the income bracket, we estimate 
this person to have paid shs. 2,970 in taxes. 2-1 percent of shs. 2,970 is shs. 63. The remaining figures were constructed 
 income bracket for the most costly (university) down to shs. 0 for a lowest income bracket individual’s contribution to the primary TTCs.  
 
 Compared with the private benefits from higher education and the earnings forgone while in school (cf. Table II), these tax costs 
are trivial. Clearly, the families whose children receive higher education are subsidized by the other families whose children are not 
educated at this level. Thus, there is substantial horizontal inequity in the existing system of financing of higher education in Kenya. 
4. Approximation of students’ families’ incomes 
 Having estimated the tax costs of Kenya’s higher education system, we now seek to determine the number of students in each 
income category receiving each type of education, then calculate the costs of each type of higher education to families in each income 
bracket, and finally compare these with the present value of the benefits accruing to the educated individuals over their working lives. 
We will do this in Section 5, but first it is necessary to approximate the incomes of students’ families based on the available socio-economic 
data.18 
 It should be noted at the outset that Kenya is mainly an agricultural country. Only 627,000 of its more than ten million people 
are employed in the ‘modem sector’. Furthermore, few persons sever their ties with agriculture, and there is a constant flow of workers 
                                            
in a similar manner. 
18 Additional details regarding the procedures by which these approximations were made are available from the author 
upon request. 
 back and forth from the cities and towns to the farms. For this reason, we must approximate both farm and non-farm income in 
determining a student’s family’s total income. 
A. Farm income 
 Farm income has two components: land income and cattle income. The land income of ith farm (L{) is defined as: 
 
 
For empirical implementation, this definition of land income is modified by assuming (a) that the average fraction of land under cultivation 
on all Kenyan farms applied to each individual farm, and (b) that the land under cultivation was divided equally among the crops grown.19 
In addition, it was not possible to estimate farm-specific or region-specific value added per acre of crop. Rather, the value added per acre 
of crop j was the average figure for all farms in the country growing that crop. Thus, for empirical estimation, the land income of the ith 
farm is taken to be 
 
 
Farm-specific figures in (2) are derived from students’ answers to the following survey questions: ‘Does your father own any land? If “yes” 
how many acres does he own? Does your father (or your mother) grow any crops to sell for money? If “yes” which crops?’ The crops 
listed as alternatives were coffee, tea, pyrethrum, cotton, and other. Figures for all Kenyan farms were derived from a small farm survey 
conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture covering 1,154 farms.20 
 The other component of farm income is the income attributable to cattle ownership. The cattle income of the ith farm is the 
                                            
19 The rationale for these assumptions is that it became apparent in a pretest of the survey questions that students did not 
know what fraction of their father’s land was under cultivation or how many acres were allocated to each crop. 
20 Jerome Wolgin used these data for a doctoral dissertation at Vale; I am grateful to him for making the value added 
figures available to me. The average fraction of land under cultivation for crops to be sold for cash was 47 per cent. The 
average value added per acre planted was shs. 185 per year for both coffee and tea, 130 for pyrethrum, 162 for cotton, 
and 146 for other. 
 In addition, I used the data from the individual farms to test whether there were significant scale effects. 
Regressing value added per acre of crop j on the number of acres of that crop in both the linear and double-logarithmic 
form, I found that the regression coefficients and coefficient of determination were in all cases insignificantly different from 
zero. In light of this, the use of a single value added per acre figure regardless of farm size would appear justified. 
 number of grade cows multiplied by the value added per grade cow in the country as a whole plus the number of non-grade cows 
multiplied by the value added per non-grade cow. The annual value added per grade and non-grade cow were calculated from the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s small farm survey and were found to be shs. 239 per year and shs. 34 per year respectively. Data on the tth 
farm’s cattle ownership were taken from the student’s response on the Parents’ Occupation Questionnaire to the question: ‘Does your 
father own any cattle? If “yes”: how many non-grade (local) cattle does he own? If “yes”: how many grade (exotic) cattle does he own?’ 
B. Non-farm Income 
 To determine the non-farm income of parents, students were asked: ‘What kinds of work does your father (or guardian) do and 
who does he work for? Write down all the kinds of work he does and describe them as clearly as you can.’ If more than one kind of work 
was reported, it was assumed that the father’s time was divided equally among the different kinds. The responses were coded to conform 
with official government job categories. 
 Data on monthly cash remuneration for each job category are collected on a firm-by-firm basis by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning.21 Unpublished summary tabulations by one-digit industrial classification were made available to me by the Ministry 
for purposes of this study. For each job category, I took the average monthly cash remuneration in each industry, weighted each by the 
number of employees in that job category in that industry, and thereby constructed a weighted average of monthly cash remuneration 
in each job category for the country as a whole. The student’s description of his parent’s work was then matched with the average 
earnings in the occupational category to determine a proxy nonfarm income.22 
C. Total income 
 The total income of an individual student’s family was estimated as the sum of the farm and non-farm income derived in the 
manner described above, and frequency distributions are presented in columns 6-8 of Table UL These data reveal three outstanding 
features: 
1. The students in Kenya’s higher education system come from families with clearly higher incomes on average than Kenya’s 
population as a whole. 
2. University students come from higher income families than students in the teacher training colleges. 
3. However, the majority of the students come from families which could not by any standard be considered ‘the elite’ (cf. Table I). 
5. Incidence of total costs paid and benefits received by income class 
 As noted earlier, the vast majority of students in higher education work for government upon completion of their studies and 
are paid according to a fixed government salary scale. It seems reasonable therefore to assume that each recipient of higher education 
receives the same monetary benefit as any other. Thus, the distribution of students by income class also is the distribution of the benefits 
                                            
21 For a description of the survey and some of the findings, see [13]. 
22 This procedure, although the beet possible, is far from ideal. Many things other than occupation determine earnings 
(see [6]). However, national data on the correlates of earnings are not available, so it was impossible to make any further 
refinements. 
 of higher education. 
 We have also seen that Kenya’s higher education system is funded almost entirely by government. On the assumption that a 
person’s contribution to a given fiscal programme is equal to his total tax contribution multiplied by the ratio of spending on the fiscal 
programme in question to total government spending, the percentage of all taxes paid by persons in each income bracket also is the 
distribution of direct costs of higher education. 
 From the distributions of benefits, tax costs, and taxpayers by income class as shown in Table EH, we find: 
1. Low and higb income families each pay a larger share of the direct costs of the University of Nairobi than their respective fractions 
of the benefits; the reverse holds for middle income people. 
2. For the teacher training colleges, the lower and middle income people each receive a larger fraction of the benefits than their 
respective shares of the costs; as with the University, high income people receive a smaller fraction of the benefits than their share 
of the costs. 
3. Low income people pay a smaller percentage of the costs relative to their numbers in the population; middle and upper income 
people pay more. 
4. Relative to their numbers in the population, children of low income families are underrepresented in the higher education system, 
middle and high income children overrepresented. 
Qualitatively, these results are not very different from studies of the higher education systems of California [4] [5] and Canada [7]. 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have examined Kenya’s higher education system with the goal of testing among three alternative hypotheses: 
that the higher education system redistributes income from rich to poor, that it redistributes income from poor to rich, or that it has no 
important effect on the distribution of income. 
 In testing the inter-generational version of these hypotheses, we have adopted a so-called ‘Equal Opportunity Criterion’, 
whereby the educational system is equitable if different income groups have access to opportunities for higher education in proportion 
to their numbers in this population. By this criterion, Kenya’s higher education system is found to be inequitable inter-generationally, 
since the few who are favoured are disproportionately the children of the well-to-do, whether measured by income class or various 
indices of socio-economic status.23For instance, 00 per cent of the students at the University of Nairobi are found to come from families 
in the lowest income brackets, but this bracket includes 90 per cent of the taxpayers. 
 The intra-generational version of these hypotheses may be tested by either of two criteria. According to the ‘Cost-Benefit 
Criterion’, by which a programme is held to be equitable if each group in the population pays a fraction of the costs equal to the fraction 
                                            
23 The fact that the educational system is inequitable in this sense does not necessarily imply that the gap in opportunities 
could be lessened within the educational system. For in the absence of an educational system, the children of the well-to-
do might have an even more exclusive hold on certain types of jobs. I thank the Editor for making this point to me. 
 of the benefits they receive, we have found that there is something akin to vertical equity in the financing of Kenya’s higher education 
system. The lowest income group pays a somewhat larger percentage of the direct costs of the University of Nairobi than it receives in 
benefits, but the reverse is true for the teacher training colleges. However, if alternatively we adopt the ‘Ability to Pay Criterion’, according 
to which a programme is equitable if the cost-benefit ratio rises as a function of income, the approximate vertical proportionality is 
inequitable and favours the well-off. 
 We should observe, though, that the main inequity in Kenya’s higher education system, though this is by no means unique to 
that particular country, is horizontal. A select few receive a very large payoff and if they were not relatively rich when they started their 
higher education, they will be relatively rich when they complete it. In other words, the system is horizontally inequitable ex poet though 
less so ex ante. While the amounts involved on a person-by-person basis are very small on the tax side, they are very substantial per 
person on the benefit side. 
 At first glance, it might appear that it is the higher education system which is responsible, but this does not seem to be the case. 
Rather, the cause seems to be adverse selection at the primary and secondary levels. Although the costs of schooling at these levels are 
heavily subsidized (about 80 per cent), pupils themselves must pay the remaining 20 per cent. This is a large and often overwhelming 
burden for many families, and as a result, many children are simply unable to attend. Even if they are able to get together the fees, poor 
families frequently find that they cannot forgo their children’s labour during planting and harvest seasons. For such families, the quality 
of the education received undoubtedly suffers. And since admission to the higher education system is conditional on succeeding on 
examinations at earlier levels, there is a systematic process operating against the poor. 
 The policy conclusion which follows from these findings is straightforward. In the absence of fundamental changes in the tax 
structure and/or wage structure, both the horizontal inequity at the higher education levels and the adverse selection at the lower levels 
could nevertheless be lessened by charging students the full costs of their education to be repaid over their working lives1 and using the 
proceeds to provide selective subsidies for the primary and secondary education of the children of the poor. In [2], I have estimated that 
this would permit virtually universal primary education under present financial arrangements or permit the abolition of fees of all those 
now attending, while at the same time having little discouraging effect on the private attractiveness of investment in higher education, 
since private rates of return would remain very high (19 per cent for university, 23 per cent for secondary teacher training, and 21 per 
cent for primary teacher training). In this way, Kenya’s higher educational system could contribute more to achieving ‘a fundamental 
objective of the Government... a just distribution of the national income’. 
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